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NOTES
MUTUAL FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS:
PUTIING A LEASH ON THE WATCHDOGS
INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds are organizations into which individuals pool their money for
the purpose of having it invested by professional managers in a diversified
portfolio.' Mutual funds have traditionally been "fraught with potential
conflicts of interest."'2 These problems stem largely from the fact that mutual
funds are typically organized and managed externally by a distinct corpora-
tion, generally referred to as the "investment adviser." The adviser, since it
appoints the fund's first board of directors, is able to place some of its own
members and affiliates on the board, thereby ensuring itself strong presence, if
not virtual domination, for the future.3 This practice places those directors
who are members or affiliates of the adviser between the conflicting interests
of the adviser in maximizing its fees and the shareholders in attaining a high
return on their investments. 4 As a result of the temptation for affiliated
directors to favor the adviser's interests, mutual fund shareholders have
resorted to derivative suits in order to preserve and protect their rights.
In view of the important function served by mutual fund derivative suits,
attention has recently been focused on the issue of whether a mutual fund's
1. Mutual funds are one type of investment company. Investment companies are organiza-
tions that sell shares to the public and use the funds received to invest in the securities of
corporations and governmental bodies. There are three types of investment companies: manage-
ment companies, face-amount certificate companies, and unit investment trusts. Mutual funds are
a subclass of management companies. A mutual fund shareholder owns a proportionate amount
of the fund's pool of securities. Face-amount certificate companies sell unsecured, nonvoting
debentures on an installment plan. Unit investment trusts sell interests in a fixed group of
securities held by a trustee. R. Pozen, Financial Institutions: Investment Management 187 (1978).
For a detailed description of investment companies, see Securities & Exchange Commission,
Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 39-45 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Public Policy Report].
Mutual funds can be either open-end or closed-end. Open-end funds offer securities to the
public on a continuing basis and are under a legal duty to repurchase their shares at approxi-
mately current net asset value. Investment Company Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1976).
Closed-end companies, on the other hand, generally do not offer securities after the Initial
capitalization and are not legally obligated to redeem their own shares. Public Policy Report,
supra, at 42.
2. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943
(1978).
3. Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-69 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton Report]; R. Jennings &
H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1393-94 (4th ed. 1977). "The investment adviser usually is well
represented on the fund's board of directors and maintains effective control over the fund."
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
10 (1967) (statement of M. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
4. See R. Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unqffiliated
Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1058, 1059-60 (1967).
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independent board members can unilaterally terminate a shareholder deriva-
tive action brought against their co-directors and the fund's investment
adviser. s Two approaches to this issue have been taken in Lasker v. Burks. 6
In that case, a derivative suit commenced by two shareholders on behalf of
Fundamental Investors, Inc. (Fundamental) charged that the adviser and
several of its present and former board members had engaged in practices
constituting "gross misconduct and a gross abuse of trust"7 when they failed
to make an independent investigation of Penn Central's financial condition
before purchasing $20 million of that company's commercial paper.8 Since a
majority of Fundamental's directors were either named defendants or
affiliated with the adviser, the board appointed a committee composed of the
minority independent directors to investigate and decide the fate of the
action. 9 On the basis of outside counsel's recommendations and their own
investigation,10 the directors concluded that the continuation of the litigation
would not be in the best interests of the fund and, therefore, moved to dismiss
the action. 11
The district court in Lasker proffered the first approach to this issue by
holding that the minority members of the board had the authority to move for
dismissal of derivative litigation. 12 In addition, the court stated that, pursuant
to the business judgment rule's policy of noninterference with business
5. It has been noted that the outcome of the controversy may reshape the securities laws,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 5, and that the resolution may "make it much harder
for stockholders to call managements to account." N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1979, at 28, col. 1.
6. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), motion to dismiss granted, 426 F. Supp. 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 75 (1978) (No. 77-1724).
7. 404 F. Supp. at 1174. Plaintiffs claimed that this conduct violated § 36 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 739 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976)).
Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the common law, § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), and breach of the advisory contract between the fund and the adviser.
404 F. Supp. at 1174.
8. 404 F. Supp. at 1174-75. In June of 1970, after Fundamental had bought the commercial
paper, Penn Central filed a petition for reorganization. As a result of Penn Central's default on
the commercial paper, Fundamental and a group of other investors instituted a suit against the
seller, Goldman, Sachs & Co., seeking rescission of their purchases of Penn Central notes. Welch
Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Since the Welch
litigation was still in progress when the Lasker action was commenced, all defendants in Lasker
moved for and were granted a stay pending resolution in Welch. In 1974, Fundamental settled its
claims in the Welch action when Goldman, Sachs & Co. agreed to take back the notes and pay
Fundamental $5.25 million in cash and assign to the fund a 73.75% interest in the proceeds of the
notes in the bankruptcy proceedings. Shortly after the settlement, the board of directors of
Fundamental met to determine what position the fund should take in the Lasker suit. 404 F.
Supp. at 1175.
9. 404 F. Supp. at 1175. For an explanation of the policy behind allowing a board of directors
to decide the fate of such an action, see notes 62-65 infa and accompanying text.
10. The director's retained the assistance of outside counsel, Stanley Fuld, former Chief Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals. He concluded that neither the adviser nor the directors were
liable. 404 F. Supp. at 1175. The disinterested directors also met with litigation counsel for
Fundamental and with three defendants in Lasker-the chairman and chief executive of the
adviser, and two unaffiliated directors of Fundamental. Id. at 1176.
11. Id. at 1176.
12. Id. at 1179.
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decisions of the board, such a motion should be granted in the absence of bad
faith, fraud, or corruption. '3 The business judgment rule, in effect, makes the
independent directors' decision almost inviolable.
The second approach, utilized by the Second Circuit in its reversal of the
district court, concluded that the independent directors of a mutual fund
generally do not have the power to terminate derivative suits 14 in light of the
policy of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA),'1 the federal regulatory
statute for mutual funds. The policy of the ICA, the court noted, clearly
intended that the independent directors check management and protect the
interests of mutual fund shareholders; it did not envision that the independent
minority would be used to approve majority action and thereby preclude
shareholder derivative suits. 16 Under this approach, the independent directors
are powerless to terminate nonfrivolous suits,' 7 even if dismissal of such a suit
would be in the best interests of the shareholders.
The extreme approaches taken by these courts provide unsatisfactory
solutions to the issue. Instead, as this Note will contend, this issue should be
resolved by a more balanced approach which recognizes both the purpose of
the ICA and the merit of the business judgment rule's "hands-off" policy
toward board decisions. In Part I this Note will explore the uniqueness of the
mutual fund industry and will discuss the relevant portions of the ICA. Part
H will then examine the two approaches taken in resolving the issue in
Lasker. Finally, in Part I, this Note will suggest a new approach to the
issue. This approach takes two factors into account: whether the directors
were actually independent and whether they exercised reasonable business
judgment in view of their pr6tective function under the ICA.
I. THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY AND THE ICA
Mutual funds are incorporated under state law; the federal statute, the
ICA, provides a regulatory rather than a chartering scheme.' 8 These funds
are typically organized by investment management companies, which are
corporations that specialize in providing professional investment advice. 19 By
pooling the assets of small investors, mutual funds are able to provide the
benefits of a professionally managed and diversified portfolio to a wide range
of investors. 20
As organizer of the fund, the investment management company appoints
13. Id. at 1180.
14. 567 F.2d at 1212.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976).
16. 567 F.2d at 1211.
17. See notes 75-76 infra and accompanying text.
18. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 704-05 & n.13 (1975);
Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Brown v.
Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 217 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); see The Mutual
Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732, 794-95 (1969). The ICA acknowledges
that state regulation of the industry is almost impossible. Investment Company Act § 1(a)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)(5) (1976).
19. Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 46-47; The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey,
44 Notre Dame Law. 732, 740-41 (1969).
20. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
943 (1978).
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the first board of directors. 21 In turn, the board enters into a contract with the
investment management company to manage the mutual fund's assets and to
provide a full range of clerical services and office space for the fund.2 2 Since
nearly all of their management and service functions are conducted externally,
mutual funds have been characterized as mere corporate "shells." 2
3
In addition to its duties as manager of the fund's assets, the investment
management company often performs two additional functions. First, the
adviser may act as underwriter to the fund when its shares are offered to the
public.2 When performing this task, the adviser generally offers the shares
through designated brokers.25 Second, the adviser may act as broker for the
fund's portfolio transactions. 26 Thus, by organizing a mutual fund, an in-
vestment adviser is potentially entitled to three forms of remuneration. As
compensation for its managerial services it receives either a fixed or declining
percentage of the fund's net assets. 27 In its underwriting capacity, the adviser
is entitled to its underwriting fee. Finally, as broker for the fund, it collects
commissions for handling the fund's portfolio transactions.
The fusion of some or all of these functions in the investment management
company provides a fertile ground for conflicts of interest. For one, an
"incestuous relationship" exists between the fund and the adviser, stemming
from the adviser's strong presence on and control of the fund's board.2 8 As a
result of this relationship, many board members negotiating the advisory
contract and fees for the adviser are caught between the competing interests
of the shareholders and the investment adviser.2 9 Moreover, when the adviser
21. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
22. The ICA requires that a written contract exist between the adviser and the mutual fund.
Investment Company Act § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1976). That contract must "precisely"
describe the adviser's compensation and must allow the fund the right to revoke without penalty
on sixty days written notice. Id. § 15(a)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(i), (3) (1976). In addition,
any contract with a term of more than two years must be approved yearly by the board or
shareholders. Id. § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (1976). By requiring yearly approval,
Congress intended to provide the fund with the opportunity to evaluate the performance of the
adviser and, if that performance is deemed unsatisfactory, to terminate the contract- Taussig v.
Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1965).
23. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
24. Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 54. "The sale of fund shares to new investors is
generally the responsibility of a 'principal underwriter' who is usually the adviser itself or a close
affiliate." Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cr.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
25. Some advisers, however, eschew designated brokers and instead offer the shares exclu-
sively through their own sales forces. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 374 (1st Cr.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
26. Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 163.
27. The vast majority of advisory contracts provide for fees based on the market value of the
fund's average net assets. Traditionally, a fixed rate of one-half of one percent has been used. Id.
at 89. After the Wharton Report was published in 1962, however, the industry began to employ a
rate which declines as the size of the fund's assets increases. Id.
28. One commentator has noted that "nothing-but nothing-approaches the open end
mutual fund for incestuous relationships." Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 663,
739 (1967) (remarks of A. Pomerantz).
29. R. Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unoiliated Direc-
tors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1058, 1059-60 (1967).
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is also the fund's broker, a conflict exists between its managerial duty to strive
for a high return on the fund's investments and its interest, as broker, to earn
commissions by handling portfolio transactions. 30 Finally, when the adviser
also functions as the underwriter, a similar conflict arises because, through its
control of the fund's board, the adviser has substantial influence on the setting
of underwriting fees.
In the 1920's and 1930's, mutual funds were plagued with abuses resulting
from these conflicts of interest. 3 1 For example, the adviser's selection of the
initial board frequently resulted in the inclusion of exculpatory clauses in the
advisory contract to shield the adviser from claims of mismanagement and in
the payment of excessive fees to the investment adviser. 32 These abuses did
not end once the appointed board's term of office ended. Through its control
of the proxy machinery and the use of staggered elections, 33 the adviser was
able to perpetuate these abuses by maintaining its dominant position on the
board.
In response to these and other pervasive abuses, Congress enacted the
Investment Company Act of 1940. 34 This legislation was designed to regulate
the mutual fund industry and to minimize its inherent conflicts of interest.3 -
As a regulatory statute, the ICA requires full disclosure of all material
information to mutual fund investors. 36 Prior to offering its shares to the
public, the fund must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a detailed registration statement, including a description of its funda-
mental investment policies. 37 Reports must also be sent periodically to share-
30. The SEC has noted that "such affiliations could possibly lead investment company
managers to adopt investment policies that call for high portfolio turnover rates for the purpose of
increasing the amount of brokerage commissions obtainable through their relationships with (the
broker]." Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 189.
31. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 37-38 (1940) (statement of R. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission). For a detailed discussion of these abuses, see The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal
Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732, 787-92 (1969).
32. Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 273 nn.34 & 37
(1941).
33. S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940); Note, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 273 n.36 (1941).
34. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
80a-1 to -52 (1976)). Congress also passed the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat.
847 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (1976)) in response to these abuses. This Act,
however, was primarily a disclosure statute and was a much weaker regulation than the ICA. R.
Pozen, Financial Institutions: Investment Management 193 (1978). This weakness is apparent In
the Act's express exclusion from its coverage of many investment advisers, such as banks, lawyers
or brokers whose investment advice is incidental to their profession, publishers of newsletters or
financial periodicals with regular circulation, or persons whose advice concerns only securities
issued or guaranteed by the United States. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(1 1) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1976)).
35. S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11-12 (1940); H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 9-10 (1940); see Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
934 (1977).
36. Investment Company Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976).
37. Id.
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holders and the SEC. 38 In addition to requiring full disclosure, the ICA also
provides the SEC with certain regulatory and enforcement powers. For
example, the SEC must approve any offer by a mutual fund to exchange its
shares at other than net asset value39 and may obtain injunctions against
directors and advisers, among others, for breach of their fiduciary duties to
the fund.
40
To minimize the conflicts of interest pervasive in the mutual fund industry
before 1940, the ICA contained two principal provisions.4 ' First, in an effort
to diminish self-dealing, the ICA prohibited certain transactions between
mutual funds and affiliated persons, including the fund's principal underwrit-
er, unless prior SEC approval was received. 42 For example, a mutual fund
could not lend money, sell property to, or buy property from, affiliated
persons in the absence of SEC approval. 43 Second, and more importantly, the
ICA provided that a portion of the fund's board must be independent, that is,
not directly or indirectly "affiliated" 44 with its investment adviser or principal
underwriter. This provision was designed to check the adviser's control over
the fund by providing shareholders with adequate representation on the
fund's board.45 At the minimum, forty percent of the board had to be com-
posed of unaffiliated directors. 46 When the potential for abuse was enhanced,
however, such as when the adviser acted as, or was affiliated with, the fund's
broker, investment banker, or principal underwriter, the ICA mandated that
a majority of the board be unaffiliated. 47 To effectuate this purpose of
protecting shareholder interests, unaffiliated directors were given certain
specific powers. Thus, for instance, the ICA provided that a majority of such
38. Id. § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1976).
39. Id. § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-11 (1976). Moreover, the ICA prohibits an investment company
from making any public offering of its securities unless it has a net worth of at least $100,000, id.
§ 14, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14 (1976), and severely restricts the issuance of senior securities by such
companies. Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1976).
40. Id. § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976).
41. The final form of the ICA was a compromise. Some people had suggested that manage-
ment be completely internalized or that it be at least separated from underwriting and brokerage
functions. The industry, however, strongly protested these proposals. As enacted, the ICA
regulates but does not eliminate the external management structure. RL Pozen, Financial
Institutions: Investment Management 190-91 (1978).
42. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 17, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976)).
43. Id. § 17(a)(1), (2), (3) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(l), (2), (3) (1976)).
44. The ICA described an affiliated person as anyone who directly or indirectly owns or
controls five percent or more of the outstanding voting securities and any officer, director,
partner, co-partner, or employee of an affiliated person. The investment adviser and any member
of an investment company's advisory board were considered affiliated persons. Id. § 2(a)(3)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976)).
45. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d at 1211; Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 418 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
46. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976)).
47. Id. § 10(b) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1976)).
19791
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
directors must approve the renewal of the advisory contract and fees48 and
must select the fund's public accountants.- 9
In the years following the enactment of the ICA, it became readily apparent
that the independent director safeguard had failed to achieve its goal of
preventing abuses"0 in the rapidly expanding mutual fund industry.5' For
one, the definition of "affiliated" directors had been too narrowly drafted.
Under this definition, close friends and relatives of the managers, and
shareholders of less than five percent of the adviser's outstanding shares were
not "affiliated" and could thereby qualify as independent directors. 52 More-
over, persons qualifying as independent directors, even if they were not
related to or financially affiliated with management, were often morally
obligated to the adviser. Through its initial appointments, the adviser con-
trolled the board and the nominations for future elections of directors. By
controlling the nominations, the adviser could perpetuate its control of the
board because, although management's nominees could always be challenged,
these nominees were, as a practical matter, routinely elected by the share-
holders. 53 As a result of this process, whereby "[t]he men who need to be
watched pick the watchdogs to watch them," 54 the independent directors that
were elected were likely to feel indebted or at least sympathetic to the adviser.
Thus, it was natural for independent directors to undertake reluctantly any
action adverse to the adviser's interests. 55
In 1970, Congress responded to these deficiencies in the independent director
safeguard by amending the ICA in two major ways. First, the amendments
imposed a stricter standard of care on the independent directors. Under the
1940 Act, directors were subject to SEC actions enjoining them from serving
in their capacity only if they had engaged in practices constituting "gross
48. Id. § 15(c) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976)).
49. Id. § 32(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (1976)).
50. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32-34 (1969), reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4897, 4927-29. The Wharton Report concluded that "the independent director
requirement may be of restricted value as an instrument for providing effective representation of
mutual fund shareholders in dealings between the fund and its investment adviser." Wharton
Report, supra note 3, at 34. As reasons for its conclusion, the report noted the control that
management had over the board, the inadequacy of the definition of "affiliated," and the minor
role that directors play in mutual fund affairs. Id.
51. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1969), reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4897, 4899-901. During the period of 1936-1952, the assets of open-end companies
increased from $506 million to approximately $4 billion, or almost 800%; between December 1952
and September 1958 those assets tripled. Wharton Report, supra note 3, at 39.
52. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969), reprinted in [1970) U.S. Code Cong, &
Ad. News 4897, 4927; Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 67-68; Wharton Report, supra note
3, at 34.
53. Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 130.
54. Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 663, 739 (1967) (remarks of A.
.Pomerantz).
55. One commentator noted: "[The independent hrector] only has some power. He is
probably reluctant to exercise that in a vigorous way, because, after all, it's unpleasant to
[reprimand] the people that he has worked with for years and likes and respects--and probably
that's the only reason that he's on the board; he wouldn't accept the job if he didn't like and
respect them . . . " Id. at 759 (remarks of P. Loomis).
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misconduct" or "gross abuse of trust. ' ' - 6 By virtue of the 1970 amendments,
directors became subject to such actions for any act amounting to "a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. "5 7 Second, the 1970 amend-
ments narrowed the definition of independent directors. The new definition
provides that all "interested" persons, as opposed to all "affiliated" persons
under the 1940 version, do not qualify as independent directors.5 8 "In-
terested" persons include those with close family ties, substantial financial or
56. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 1
U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976)).
57. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976)). Although this section, before it was amended in 1970,
granted the SEC a cause of action, it did not provide an express right of action for shareholders.
Nevertheless, courts traditionally implied a shareholder cause of action under the original § 36.
Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970); Epslin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 222-28 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 415, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1961). The Eighth Circuit, however, reasoning that the
failure to provide a private remedy in the ICA was a deliberate omission, has refused to imply a
shareholder cause of action under § 36. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc_, 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.),
vacated per curian as nwot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). But see Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378
F.2d 783, 793 (8th Cir. 1967) ("[T]he strong indications are, that if given the opportunity, the
Supreme Court would also find an implied civil liability in the Investment Company Act and
thereby overrule our opinion in Brouk.').
The 1970 amendments also added § 36(b), which expressly provides for a shareholder
derivative action against the adviser for excessive management fees. Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at 15 US.C. §
80a-35(b) (1976)). The creation of an express cause of action in § 36(b) suggests an argument that
Congress intended to abrogate the case law implying a private action under the original section.
Such an argument, however, is unsupported by the legislative history of the amendments. The
purpose in adding subsection (b) was to ameliorate the "unduly restrictive" standard of "corporate
waste" which shareholders had been required to prove in implied derivative actions for excessive
fees under the original § 36. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969), reprinted in 11970]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4897, 4901; see Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 812
n.12 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978). The section was not intended to abrogate
by implication subsection (a) and its case law. See S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 16
(1969), reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4897, 4911 eITlhe fact that subsection
(b) specifically provides for a private right of action should not be read by implication to affect
subsection (a).'). Consistent with this intention, Congress eased the standard of liability in
§ 36(a) from "gross misconduct" to a "breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." The
argument that § 36(b) was intended to abrogate implied actions under subsection (a) has been
rejected by the courts. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
934 (1977) (by providing an express cause of action in § 36(b) Congress did not intend to abrogate
private action under § 36(a) previously recognized by the courts); Moses v. Burgin, 44S F.2d 369,
373 n.7 (1st Cir.) (protection of shareholders was intended by § 36, and, although amended to
grant certain express causes of action, this can best be effectuated by allowing private causes of
action), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Contra, Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 1413
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976)). The 1970 amendments, however, did not adopt the definition of
"interested" in place of "affiliated" for the purposes of §§ 10(f) and 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(f),
-17 (1976), which deal with insider transactions.
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professional relationships with the adviser or underwriter, and those with
beneficial or legal interests as fiduciaries in securities issued by the adviser or
underwriter.5 9
Although this definition excludes individuals manifestly interested in the
fund or its adviser, it will not be a panacea for mutual fund abuses. The
subtle influences, almost impervious to proof, 60 that come to bear upon a
director in the board's conference room are a reality which cannot be totally
eradicated by any statutorily mandated percentage of independent directors.
This reality should be acknowledged and its effects should not be ignored.
II. THE Two APPROACHES
As a result of the unique structure, organization, and regulation of mutual
funds, the question of whether independent directors of a fund can terminate
derivative litigation has arisen. In the absence of any explicit guidance from
the ICA or its legislative history, 6 1 the federal courts have developed two
approaches to the resolution of the issue.
The first approach, adopted by the district court in Lasker, provides that
the independent directors of a mutual fund have the power to decide whether
a derivative suit should be terminated or allowed to proceed and that, under
the business judgment rule, such a decision is not reviewable by the courts
unless bad faith, fraud, corruption, or a similar impropriety is shown. 62 This
reliance on the business judgment rule reflects the court's unwillingness to
substitute its own judgment for that of the directors. 63
59. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 2(a)(3), 84 Stit.
1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976)). Any registered brokers, dealers or their
affiliated persons and anyone who has acted as legal counsel for the investment company within
the last two fiscal years are also considered "interested." Id.
Congress also addressed the independent directors' inadequacy as a check on management in
the area of management fees. This inadequacy resulted from the lack of arm's length bargaining
between the adviser and the fund's directors in fee negotiations. For one, the adviser usually had
strong representation on the fund's board. Second, the adviser sometimes possessed all the fund's
business records and therefore could hamper any attempts by the independent directors to obtain
them. Third, if they chose to bargain with another adviser, the independent directors would
subject the fund to the uncertainty of relying on the untested performance of a new organization.
Finally, the independent faction of the board might not have the power to obtain a new adviser.
Public Policy Report, supra note 1, at 130. Thus, the independent director safeguard in this area
was termed a "myth." Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737, Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 769 (1969) (statement of A. Pome'rantz). In response to this inadequacy
Congress added § 36(b) to the ICA. This section serves to curb excessive fees by placing a specific
fiduciary duty on investment advisers with respect to their compensation and by providing an
express cause of action for both the shareholders and the SEC.
60. One court has noted that "tangible indications of bias on the part of the unaffiliated
[directors] are rarely present . . . . [C]ontrol of a mutual fund by its advisor is the result of
intangible factors arising out of the unique structure of the industry." Boyko v. Reserve Fund
Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. Although some specific duties of independent directors are spelled out in the Act, neither
the ICA nor its legislative history makes reference to the role of these directors when a derivative
suit is commenced against their co-directors and the fund's adviser.
62. 404 F. Supp. at 1179.
63. The business judgment rule originated in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Witters v. Sowles, 31 F. 1, 2 (C.C.D. Vt. 1887); Spering's Appeal,
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Within the context of board decisions concerning derivative suits, the
principal purpose behind the application of the rule has traditionally been to
provide the directors, who are empowered to run the corporation's business,
with the liberty to decide whether it is in the best interest of their company to
allow the derivative action to proceed. 64 This deference to the board's
business judgment permits the directors not only to terminate meritless
actions, but also to squelch meritorious claims when the merit of and potential
recovery under the claim are outweighed by the costs of litigation and the
adverse effect the action may have on the business relationship between the
corporation and the potential defendant.65
The Lasker district court did not find that the disinterested directors' duty
to safeguard shareholder interests warranted a modification in the business
judgment rule. 66 It did observe, however, that the actual independence of the
disinterested directors affected the issue of bad faith.6 7 Accordingly, the court
permitted further discovery on the issue of independence. 6 After considering
a myriad of factors on remand, such as the directors' remuneration for service
71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872). The policy behind the rule is to permit management to run the business of
the company without fear of liability resulting from mere errors in judgment. The rule is applied
only if the directors acted within their authority, in good faith and without bias, and in the honest
belief that the corporation's best interests were served by their decision. See H. Henn, Handbook
of the Law of Corporations § 242, at 482-83 (1970).
The rule has been applied to actions brought by shareholders against corporate directors. E.g.,
Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 (8th Cir.) (directors' decision to merge with
another corporation did not involve improper motives or self-dealing and would not be reviewed
by the court), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Schein v. Caeser's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 18
(5th Cir.) (directors incur no liability to the corporation for exercise of their business judgment in
executing a compromise agreement regarding the purchase of corporate stock), cert, denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(management is not liable for good faith business decision to bring action to resist tender offer).
The rule has also been applied to prevent shareholders from forcing the corporation to
prosecute claims against third parties. E.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917) (enforcement of a corporate cause of action is, like other business
questions, a matter ordinarily left to the discretion of the.directors); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell
Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903) (directors presumably act in the best interests of all
and, when they elect not to pursue a cause of action, dissenting shareholders may not always call
on the courts to enforce such corporate rights); Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965)
(unless bad faith or bias are shown, shareholder lacks standing to sue derivatively), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 927 (1966); Bernstein v. Mediobanca di Credito Finanziario-S.p.A., 69 F.R.D. 592,
595 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (unless something worse than unsound business judgment is shown,
derivative suits may not be maintained).
64. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978). Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973); see 3B Moore's Federal Practice 'F 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1978).
65. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978); see Comment,
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockhdolder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev.
168, 168 (1976).
66. The court felt that the policy behind the ICA does not preclude a board of directors'
exercise of business judgment. 404 F. Supp. at 1179.
67. Id. at 1180.
68. Procedurally, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to renew
upon completion of discovery. Id.
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on boards of other mutual funds managed by the same adviser, the directors'
relationship to other board members at the time of their nomination, and the
fact that the relationship between mutual funds and advisers may raise an
inference of nonindependence or control, the court concluded that the un-
affiliated directors were truly independent and granted the defendants' motion
for dismissal. 69
The second approach was adopted by the Second Circuit on appeal of
Lasker. It provides that mutual fund independent directors do not have the
power to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative action brought against majority
directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. 70 This approach, unlike the
district court's, is based primarily on the ICA's policy of protecting sharehold-
ers of mutual funds. In its decision, the Second Circuit noted that the
statutorily mandated independent directors were intended by Congress to act
as a check on management and its representatives and affiliates on the
board. 71 To'effectuate this purpose, the ICA granted independent directors
certain specific powers. 72 This "watchdog" authority, however, did not in-
clude any explicit power to terminate derivative suits. 73 Moreover, the court
decided that the implication of such a power would be inconsistent with the
ICA's policy of protecting shareholders because the independent directors'
moral obligation to the adviser inevitably precludes the objectivity necessary
for exercising impartial judgment. 74 Accordingly, since these directors cannot
be expected to make an objective decision regarding their colleagues, the
court concluded that independent directors are simply without the power to
terminate derivative suits. 75 The court did, however, recognize one possible
exception when it noted in dictum that independent directors might have the
power to terminate frivolous suits.7 6
III. A NEW APPROACH
Neither the district court nor the circuit court approach to the issue of the
power of independent directors to terminate a shareholder derivative suit is
wholly satisfactory. The district court approach fails to incorporate the policy
of the ICA, while the circuit court, by misinterpreting that policy, unduly
limits the independent directors' power to participate in running the business
of a mutual fund. A more appropriate approach to this question would
69. 426 F. Supp. at 853.
70. 567 F.2d at 1212.
71. Id. at 1211.
72. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
73. 567 F.2d at 1211.
74. "It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will view
with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an adverse
decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals
concerned. . . . [I]t cannot be expected that the public or the Fund's stockholders would believe
that these five statutorily disinterested directors could act with that impartiality and objectivity
which the public interest requires." Id. at 1212. (footnote omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. Although the court left no guidelines, frivolous suits presumably are claims without
merit.
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incorporate both the merits of the business judgment rule's "hands-off" policy
toward board decisions and the policy of the ICA to protect shareholders from
the conflicts of interest and other abuses that have traditionally plagued the
mutual fund industry.
The district court's business judgment approach was satisfactory in part
because it recognized the fact that independent directors possess the powers
generally available to directors of ordinary corporations. Support for this
conclusion is found in the legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the
ICA. To explain the intended effect of section 36(b), which grants sharehold-
ers an express cause of action against the adviser for excessive management
fees, 77 the Senate Report states that the provision
is not designed to ignore concepts developed by the courts as to the authority and
responsibility of directors. Indeed, this section is designed to strengthen the ability of
the [independent] directors to deal with these matters .... [It] is not intended to shift
the responsibility for managing an investment company in the best interest of its
shareholders from the directors of such company to the judiciary. 78
Additional support for this conclusion exists in court decisions which have
recognized that, in order to carry out effectively iheir watchdog function,
independent directors must be empowered with substantially the same author-
ity available to ordinary directors. 79 One power available to directors of
ordinary corporations is the ability to terminate a derivative action when such
a suit would not be in the best interest of their company.8 0 Accordingly, since
independent directors possess the same powers as ordinary directors, they
should be able to decide the fate of derivative litigation.
Nonetheless, the district court approach is deficient since it fails to recog-
nize that the policy of the ICA places constraints on the independent directors'
exercise of this power to terminate shareholder suits. Under the ICA, these
directors are intended to champion shareholder interests. s 1 The specific
powers granted them, such as the authority to approve the investment
adviser's contract and to review portfolio transactions, are all consistent with
this watchdog function. It is submitted that the independent directors'
exercise of general directorial powers, such as the power to terminate deriva-
tive suits, should similarly comport with the ICA's policy. The district court
did not conclude that this policy constrained the employment of general
powers; instead, that approach placed only one limitation on the exercise of
77. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976)).
78. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969), reprinted in (1970] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4897, 4903.
79. Unless limited by the ICA or its legislative history, independent directors are empowered
with the authority available to directors of ordinary corporations. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552
F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir.) (decision to recapture brokerage commissions is within directors' power),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); see In re Kaufman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 266-67
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
80. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
81. The independent director is "to provide a means for the representation of shareholder
interests in investment company affairs." S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4897, 4927.
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these powers-independence of the directors.8 2 This approach is unsatisfac-
tory since it may result in the exercise of the power to terminate in situations
where the ICA's policy of protecting the best interests of the shareholders
would be served by allowing the suit to proceed.
The Second Circuit's approach, on the other hand, is satisfactory in part
since it recognizes that the ICA places constraints on the exercise by indepen-
dent directors of general directorial powers. That court, however, misinter-
preted the ICA's policy to mean that, with the exception of frivolous cases,
the independent directors cannot exercise this power to terminate. The policy
of the ICA does not so narrowly circumscribe the power to terminate. The
ICA's purpose is to protect the best interests of shareholders. This purpose
can sometimes be better served by allowing directors to terminate even a
nonfrivolous action, such as a suit that will yield an inadequate recovery or
will disrupt the fund's business.
A better approach to this issue recognizes that independent directors are
empowered by the ICA to terminate derivative suits, but that the exercise of
that power must be consistent with their function under the ICA of protecting
shareholder interests. In order to determine whether the exercise of their
power was consistent with the ICA's policy, a court must examine two
factors: (1) whether the independent directors were actually independent; and
(2) whether their decision was a reasonable exercise of their business judg-
ment. If either of these factors is not satisfied, then the directors should not be
permitted to terminate the shareholder derivative suit.
The first factor, independence, requires an examination of the directors'
relationship with the adviser, their relations to other members of the board,
and the percentage of the board which is disinterested. These factors were
examined by the district court in Lasker when it conducted a similar inquiry
into the actual independence of the directors.8 3 In one respect, however, the
suggested approach goes beyond the district court's inquiry. This approach
places more weight on the question of whether the independent directors
comprise a minority or majority of the board. When the disinterested faction
makes up only a minority of the board,8 4 there is a dangerous possibility that
they are subject to the whims of the majority and cannot act independently.
For example, the fact that they were nominated by a committee controlled by
the majority, as was alleged in Lasker,8 5 may indicate that they "were [not]
selected ... to protect the interests of the minority stockholders and to assure
82. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
83. The court noted that each of the independent directors had served on the board of other
funds managed by the same adviser and had received compensation for his services. Moreover,
the court considered the fact that each of the independent directors knew one or more of the
defendants before they were elected to the board. Nonetheless, the court concluded that such
relationships were not enough to create an inference of nonindependence. 426 F. Supp. at 849.
84. In Lasker, the independent directors were a minority of the board. 404 F. Supp. at 1175.
Typically, however, these directors comprise a majority of the board. Section 10(b) of the ICA, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1976), requires a majority of independent directors if the fund's investment
adviser is affiliated with a broker or underwriter. This is often the case. Public Policy Report,
supra note 1, at 162; L. Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
1251, 1257 n.18 (1967).
85. Appellants' Brief at 64, Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
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a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the offending majority."8 6
Accordingly, whenever the disinterested directors comprise a minority, a
presumption of nonindependence should be made and the burden of proof on
this issue should be borne by the party seeking dismissal.
The second part of the suggested approach requires that the decision to
terminate derivative litigation be reasonable in view of the independent
directors' watchdog function.8 7 This inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of
the decision at the time and under the circumstances it was made and not on
its correctness in retrospect. 88 This test would be satisfied if prudent indepen-
dent directors, fully aware of their responsibilities to the shareholders, would
decide to terminate the derivative suit under the circumstances prevailing at
the time of the decision. Simply put, a reasonable director would decide to
terminate if the adverse business effects and the cost of litigation outweighed
the possible recovery from the action.
In determining reasonableness, the question of whether the independent
directors were aware of all facts relevant to the case should be weighted
86. Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
87. A test of reasonableness was recently used to review the decision of mutual fund
independent directors not to recapture commissions from brokers who had executed the fund's
portfolio transactions. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
934 (1977). In that case, a shareholder of Chemical Fund, Inc., a mutual fund, brought a
derivative suit against the fund's investment adviser, the adviser's parent company, and an
affiliated director of the fund, alleging that these defendants had breached their fiduciary duty
under § 36 of the ICA. Id. at 416. In her suit, the shareholder contended that it was a
common practice in the mutual fund industry for executing brokers to "give-up" a portion of their
commissions. This practice provided the fund's directors with the option to direct these excess
commissions to other brokers who had compiled outstanding records selling the fund's shares or
to recapture them for the fund by, for example, directing the commissions to an affiliate of the
adviser to be set off against the adviser's management fee. Id. at 412. Plaintiff argued that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the fund and its shareholders when they persuaded
the independent directors to forego recapture of the excess commissions in order to allocate them
to other brokers. Id. at 413.
The Tannenbaum court concluded that the ICA permits the independent directors to exercise
their discretion and decide whether it is in the best interest of the fund to recapture. Id. at 417.
Noting, however, that "such discretion is by no means unrestrained," id. the court proceeded to
review the reasonableness of the directors' decision. Id. at 427-28.
The Tannenbaum court's test of reasonableness required a "careful investigation of the
possibilities [to recapture] with an eye eager to discern them rather than shut against them, and, if
these possibilities were found to be real, a weighing of their legal difficulties and their economic
pros and cons." Id. at 418 (quoting Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 749-SO (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976)).
Courts have also employed a test of reasonableness to review proposed derivative suit
settlements between a corporation's directors and shareholders. E.g., Schusselberg v. Colonial
Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Mass. 1974); see 3B Moore's Federal Practice
23.1.24[2], at 23.1-137 to -139 (2d ed. 1978). Such a test has also been applied to review the
settlement of a derivative action brought by mutual fund shareholders against the fund's adviser.
West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ('Approval should
be given if the settlement offered is fair, reasonable, and adequate."), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
88. This distinction was emphasized in Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977), discussed at note 87 supra.
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heavily because, unless these directors are fully informed, they will be unable
to "exercise the independent judgment that Congress clearly intended." 8 9
Accordingly, if the court finds that the independent directors were unaware of
some of the relevant facts, it should make a presumption of unreasonableness.
This presumption can be rebutted if the court finds that the additional facts
were supportive of the directors' decision or, if not supportive, that the
independent directors would have nevertheless reached the same decision.
This approach is distinguishable from the approaches of the two Lasker
courts. The Second Circuit found the independent directors powerless to
terminate nonfrivolous derivative suits.90 In contrast, the suggested approach
acknowledges that independent directors have the power to decide the fate of
these suits. The district court, on the other hand, found that the independent
directors possess the power to decide the fate of derivative suits but held that,
absent a showing of nonindependence, the business judgment rule precludes
any judicial review of their decision. 9 1 The suggested approach, however,
mandates a review of the reasonableness of the directors' decision regardless
of independence. 92
When applied to the facts of Lasker, the suggested approach would find
that the "disinterested" directors were not truly independent. Initially, a
presumption of nonindependence would be made because of the disinterested
directors' minority status on the board. 93 This presumption would not appear
to be rebutted under the facts of the case. For example, the qualifications
89. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 377 (1st Cir.), ce r. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); accord,
Imperial Fin. Servs., Inc., 42 S.E.C. 717 (1965). "The Investment Company Act's requirement as
to unaffiliated directors, if its purposes are not to be subverted, carries with it the obligation on
the part of the affiliated directors, and the investment adviser itself, to insure that unaffiliated
directors are furnished with sufficient information so as to enable them to participate effectively
in the management of the investment company." Id. at 730.
In Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971), the court
followed this directive from the SEC and held that the ICA imposes a duty of full disclosure to
the independent directors on the adviser and affiliated directors. The court noted that the
independent directors may not always be familiar with the "special and often technical problems
of fund operation[s]" and that this should be considered when deciding whether the information
supplied to them is adequate. Id. at 377. This requirement of full disclosure was subsequently
applied in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976). In
that case, the court found that adequate disclosure to the unaffiliated directors had not been made
when one of the directors affiliated with the adviser sent a copy of a relevant SEC release to the
unaffiliated directors but did not discuss with them the particular application it might have had
on the matter they were considering. Id. at 746-49. Finally, the Second Circuit in Tannenbaum
v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977), required the independent
directors to be fully informed. There, the court found the disclosure adequate when the
independent directors were furnished with all relevant administrative, judicial, and legislative
developments and were made aware of the possibility of recapture and the procedure that would
have to be followed to effectuate it. Id. at 427.
90. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
92. In a recent case not arising under the ICA, the court noted that there is some support for
the judiciary to review the reasonableness of the directors' decision that a derivative suit is not in
the best interests of their corporation. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,
274-75 (3d Cir. 1978) (dictum).
93. See text following note 86 supra.
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committee that screened potential nominees for the board and the nominating
committee itself were both dominated by the defendants. 94 These circum-
stances suggest that the majority may have had a degree of influence over the
disinterested directors that would in all likelihood impair their ability to
exercise impartial judgment. Moreover, it appears that the independent
directors were elected to the board after the defendants had been made aware
of the possibility that some legal action might be taken against them by the
fund. 95 This fact suggests the possibility that the selection of these disin-
terested directors may have been dependent upon their attitude towards
"vigorous prosecution of . . . litigation against the offending majority.19 6
Despite their apparent nonindependence, the "disinterested" directors seem
to have made a reasonable business decision. For one, on the basis of the facts
recited in the opinions of the district court and the circuit court, it appears
that the independent directors were fully informed. This information was
primarily supplied by outside counsel's report, which was the product of an
extensive review of the relevant files of the fund and its adviser.97 In addition,
the independent directors questioned outside counsel and both the fund's and
adviser's officers and directors about the "merits of the derivative action and
the alternatives open to the Fund's Board. '98 Thus, since these directors were
fully informed, no presumption of unreasonableness should be made.
Second, the decision to terminate the derivative suit is reasonable since the
adverse effects of the litigation seem to outweigh the potential recovery for the
fund.99 The directors concluded that if the action were allowed to proceed,
the fund's business would be adversely affected since the relationship between
the adviser and the fund would be severely strained. As a result, the directors
believed that this would require the hiring of a new adviser, thereby causing
delay, uncertainty, and lapse in the management of the fund's affairs.100 On
94. Appellant's Brief at 64-66, Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
95. Id. at 66-68.
96. Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
97. The report suggested three possible courses of action for the directors: (1) prosecution of
the claim by the fund; (2) termination; or (3) adoption of a neutral position, thus allowing the
derivative suit to proceed. 404 F. Supp. at 1176. The report concluded that neither the adviser
nor the directors had breached any statutory, common law, or contractual obligation to the fund.
Id. at 1175-76.
If the independent directors had been unaware of the various options available, or if the
adviser's files had been withheld from their view, a finding that the directors were not fully
informed might be warranted. Cf. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 749 (2d Cir. 1975) (directors
were not fully informed when they were merely provided with a copy of an SEC release relevant
to the issue of recapture {rnd some "causal advice from a lawyer having a personal stake adverse
to the shareholders'), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
98. 404 F. Supp. at 1176.
99. The directors felt that, given Judge Fuld's opinion, the expenses and risks involved in
prosecuting the action simply outweighed any possible recovery. Id. at 1177. The directors also
concluded that defendants' investment in Penn Central was prudent at the time of the purchase.
This conclusion seems questionable in light of the ample warnings of Penn Central's troublesome
financial situation that appeared in the press before the fund began purchasing the company's
securities in December of 1969. See University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F.
Supp. 879, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ($40.2 million loss for first three quarters of 1969 reported on
October 20, 1969).
100. 404 F. Supp. at 1176.
1979]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the other hand, the potential recovery for the fund did not seem promising.
This assessment was based primarily on outside counsel's conclusion that the
suit lacked merit. 10
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the director's decision, the applica-
tion of the suggested approach to the facts of Lasker dictates the denial of
defendants' motion to dismiss because the decisionmakers were not truly
independent. This result is consistent with the policy of the ICA. As has been
noted, that policy seeks to guarantee adequate representation of shareholder
interests. Congress believed that the independent director safeguard would be
sufficient to ensure such representation. When the disinterested directors are
not truly independent, however, the congressional mechanism for providing
representation breaks down. In such a case derivative suits become the only
device through which shareholders can protect their interests. Thus, when the
disinterested directors do not satisfy the truly independent test, it is appropri-
ate to allow the derivative suit to proceed.
CONCLUSION
The unique structure of mutual funds dictates that somewhat unorthodox
methods be used to ensure the protection of those who entrust their money to
these institutions. Congress has chosen the independent director check as a
means to achieve this goal. This choice, however, has left the courts with the
difficult task of accurately defining the exact role of these directors in running
the affairs of a mutual fund. In deciding whether independent directors can
terminate derivative suits, the courts have adopted two extreme approaches.
As an alternative, this Note has suggested an approach which recognizes the
independent directors' function "to provide a means for the representation of
shareholder interests"' 0 2 and supplies the tools with which a court can
scrutinize the decisions of independent directors in order to ensure that these
interests have been emphasized.
Ezio Scaldaferri
101. Id. The hiring of outside counsel in Lasker was evidently intended to comply with the
suggestion made in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824
(1976), that it would be preferable to "have the investigation of recapture methods and their legal
consequences performed by disinterested counsel furnished to the independent directors." Id. at
750 (footnote omitted).
The decision to terminate would have been unreasonable if, for example, outside counsel had
concluded that the defendants were most likely, or at least probably, liable. In such a case, the
adverse effects on the relationship between the fund and the adviser would be outweighed by the
likelihood of gains. Indeed, notwithstanding the prosecution of the derivative suit, a finding that
the adviser was probably liable would seem to suggest inferior performance on the adviser's part
and indicate that a change in management might be advisable.
102. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4897, 4927.
